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MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS
Following the instruction slide, the five trials of the corresponding condition were presented. Each trial started with the presentation of the signal "READY" during 1.5 s, followed by an empty screen for 1 s. Then, a cue word was presented, and participants were instructed to retrieve or imagine a specific event, as quickly as possible, in response to the cue. As soon as an appropriate event came to mind, they were instructed to press the spacebar (which recorded RT) and to briefly describe the recalled or imagined event on a sheet of paper (if no appropriate event came to mind within 90 s of the word cue being presented, the computer terminated the trial automatically, and the participant was requested to initiate a new trial). Then, participants were asked to judge whether the event came to their mind directly or whether some active search was necessary. Definitions of direct and generative access (which were adapted from Uzer et al., 2012) were provided before the experiment: participants were told that sometimes memories or imagined future events can automatically come to mind (i.e., with little or no effort), whereas at other times memories or imagined future events have to be actively searched. It was explained that during the task some memories or imagined future events might be immediately triggered by the cue word, but sometimes the participant would need to actively search and reflect in order to find a suitable event. For each trial, participants were instructed to press the key 1 if the event came directly to mind or the key 2 if the production of the event required an active search effort. Finally, participants were invited to write a brief title for the event, which was used to identify events in the next phase of the experiment.
Immediately after the five trials of a given condition, participants were instructed to come back to each of the five events they had recalled or imagined and, for each event, they estimated its temporal distance (in hours, days, weeks, months and years), they indicated whether they already thought about this event on a previous occasion (by answering "yes" or MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS "no"; if they responded "yes", they were also asked to rate the extent to which they previously thought about this event, from 1 = very rarely, to 7 = very often), and they rated the personal importance of the event (from 1= not at all important, to 7 = extremely important) and its affective valence (-3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +3 = very positive). For future events, participants also estimated the probability that the imagined event would actually happen in the future (1 = extremely low, 7 = extremely high). After making these judgments for each of the five events, participants proceeded to the next condition. The order of presentation of the four conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
Before starting the experimental trials, participants received two practice trials (with different cue words) that were then discussed with the experimenter to ensure that participants correctly understood all instructions.
Results
The reported estimations of temporal distance confirmed that participants produced events falling in the required categories; the mean temporal distance was, in days, 1550 in the distant past condition, 1071 in the distant future condition, 4 in the recent past condition, and 5 in the near future condition.
The mean proportion of events that directly came to mind in response to the cues (as estimated by participants) is shown on Figure 1 , as a function of temporal orientation (past vs. future) and temporal distance (near vs. distant). As can be seen, the majority of events were produced directly, not only for past events but also for future events. A 2 (temporal orientation) x 2 (temporal distance) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant effect of temporal distance, F(1, 31) = 5.08, p = 0.03, η p 2 = 0.14,
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indicating that the direct mode of production was more frequent when recalling or imagining events that refer to a temporally close time period. There was no significant effect of temporal orientation, F(1, 31) = 2.59, p = 0.12, η p 2 = 0.08, and no interaction between temporal orientation and temporal distance, F(1, 31) = 0.38, p = 0.54, η p 2 = 0.01.
Next, we examined whether RTs differed as a function of the mode of production of events. For each participant, we computed median RTs for direct and generative responses in the past and future event conditions (four participants were excluded from this analysis because they did not provide any generative response in the past or future event conditions).
The means across participants are shown in Figure 2 , as a function of the mode of production of events and their temporal orientation. A 2 (mode) x 2 (temporal orientation) ANOVA yielded a significant effect of mode, F(1, 27) = 49.67, p < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.65, showing that RTs were faster for direct than generative responses. There was no significant effect of temporal orientation, F(1, 27) = 2.72, p = 0.11, η p 2 = 0.09, but the interaction between temporal orientation and mode was significant, F(1, 27) = 6.03, p = 0.02, η p 2 = 0.18. Followup t-contrasts showed that there was no significant difference in RTs between past and future events when the events were produced directly, t(27) = 0.95, p = 0.35, d = 0.18, but future events were produced faster than past events in the generative mode, t(27) = 2.21, p = 0.04, d
= 0.42.
This latter finding was somewhat unexpected and we further investigated whether these faster RTs could be related to the extent to which participants had previously thought about the reported events. 1 We indeed found that, for events reported in the generative mode, the proportion of events that had been thought of previously was significantly higher for future events than for past events, t(27) = 2.05, p = 0.049, d = 0.39, such that the above-14 MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS mentioned difference in RTs could in part be due to differences in previous thoughts about the events. Therefore, we examined whether RTs in the generative mode would differ between past and future events that had not been thought of previously. When looking specifically at this subset of events, there was no significant difference in RTs between past and future events, t(18) = 1.24, p = 0.23, d = 0.29, although numerically the difference was still in the same direction (means of median RTs were 12573 ms, SEM = 1720 ms, and 9938 ms, SEM = 1231 ms, for past and future events, respectively). This analysis should be taken with caution, however, because only 19 participants could be included (i.e., participants who reported at least one event that had not been thought of previously, both in the past and in the future conditions) and many of the data points (12 out of 38) were computed on the basis of only one event (e.g., because the participant reported only one past event that had not been thought of previously).
An important goal of this study was to determine whether the direct mode of production of events depended on having previously thought about these events, as well as on their personal importance and affective value. To examine these questions, we conducted a series of logistic regressions to investigate the effect of each variable on the odds of the direct mode of production of events. To account for the hierarchical structure of the data (i.e., events are nested within participants and are thus not independent), we used multilevel modeling (Goldstein, 2011) with events as level 1 units and participants as level 2 units. These analyses were performed using MLwiN and second-order penalized quasi-likelihood as estimation method (Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2011) .
For past events, we found that the percentage of direct responses was significantly higher for events that had been thought of previously (67%) than for events that had not been thought of previously (50%; coefficient = 0.73, SE = 0.25, Z = 2.92, p = 0.003). A similar MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS trend was observed for future events, with the percentage of direct responses being respectively 71% and 60% for events that had been thought of and events that had not been thought of previously (coefficient = 0.52, SE = 0.27, Z = 1.93, p = 0.054). Furthermore, among past and future events that had been thought of previously, the odds of direct response increased with the frequency of previous thoughts about the events (past events: coefficient = 0.22, SE = 0.11, Z = 2.00, p = 0.04; future events: coefficient = 0.34, SE = 0.10, Z = 3.45, p < 0.001). Thus, for both the past and future, having previously thought about an event seems an important determinant of direct production. In fact, the majority of events that were produced directly had been thought of on a previous occasion, with no significant difference between past and future events in this respect (69% of past events and 73% of future events that were produced directly had been thought of on a previous occasion; coefficient = 0.18, SE = 0.23, Z = 0.78, p = 0.43).
For both past and future events, we also found that the odds of direct response increased with the importance attributed to the events (past events: coefficient = 0.41, SE = 0.08, Z = 5.13, p < 0.001; future events: coefficient = 0.20, SE = 0.08, Z = 2.40, p = 0.02).
With regard to affective valence, an initial inspection of the percentage of direct responses across levels of the 7-point rating scale showed a V-shaped relation between the ratings and the frequency of direct responses, suggesting that the occurrence of direct responses increased with the affective intensity of events. Therefore, we created a new variable reflecting the affective intensity of events by taking the absolute value of affective ratings and investigated whether this variable predicted the odds of direct response. For past events, the odds of direct response significantly increased with the affective intensity of events (coefficient = 0.42, SE = 0.12, Z = 3.50, p < 0.001); a similar trend was observed for future events, although the effect failed to reach statistical significance (coefficient = 0.22, SE= 0.12, Z = 1.83, p = 0.066). MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS Finally, we found that for future events the odds of direct response significantly increased with the perceived probability that the imagined events would actually happen in the future (coefficient = 0.40, SE = 0.10, Z = 4.08, p < 0.001).
All the effects on the odds of direct response reported above remained unchanged when temporal distance was entered in the model (coded as a categorical variable: close vs. distant), and there was no interaction between the variable of interest and temporal distance, with the following exception: for future events, a significant interaction term indicated that the effect of importance on the odds of direct response was more pronounced for the distant future than for the near future (coefficient = 0.40, SE = 0.17, Z = 2.35, p = 0.02).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Uzer et al. (2012) that directly retrieved memories are common in the cue-word paradigm, with the percentage of directly retrieved memories being comparable between the two studies (i.e., around 60%). Also consistent with the results of Uzer et al., we found that directly retrieved memories were formed much faster than generated memories. Our main aim was then to investigate whether the direct production of episodic future thoughts is also frequent in the same word cueing conditions. We found that the direct production of event representations was as frequent and as fast for episodic future thoughts as it was for memories. This finding provides novel and more straightforward evidence that future event representations are often produced immediately and with no apparent search effort in the word cueing task.
Another important contribution of Experiment 1 is to shed light on the determinants of the direct mode of production of events. As expected, we found that most events that were MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS produced directly had already been thought of on previous occasions. This was not only the case for past events but also for future events, suggesting that most episodic future thoughts that were produced directly were memories of the future rather than newly imagined future events. Besides previous thoughts, our results also showed that the frequency of direct access increased as a function of the personal significance of events (as reflected by ratings of importance and emotional value).
While the direct production of autobiographical representations was common whatever the contemplated time period, a significant effect of temporal distance was observed, showing that direct access was more frequent for the recent past and near future than for the distant past and future. This suggests that memories and future thoughts are more readily accessible when they are closely related to the present. Such highly accessible memories for recent past experiences and anticipated experiences might function to keep us tightly connected to our current goals and plans (Conway, 2009 ).
An unexpected finding was that, when event representations were not produced directly, people took more time for generating memories than future thoughts. This seems in contradiction with some previous studies that used a similar cueing paradigm and found that RTs either did not differ between past and future events or were faster for past than for future events (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012) . However, these previous studies did not assess the modes of production of event representations and they likely involved a mix of direct and generative processes, which renders a direct comparison with our data difficult. One possible explanation for the present finding is that this difference in RTs was, at least in part, due to previous thoughts about the events: indeed, the proportion of events produced in the generative mode that had been thought of previously was significantly higher for future events than for past events and, when only the subset of events that had not been thought of previously were MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS analyzed, the difference between past and future events in RTs was no longer statistically significant (although numerically, the difference was still in the same direction). Another, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanation would capitalize on the idea that remembering the past is more constrained by reality concerns than is imagining the future (Van Boven, Kane, & McGraw, 2009) : in the former case, one has to produce an event that actually happened (or at least that one believes actually happened), thus adding a search parameter that could slow down the generative process.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 show that the direct production of episodic future thoughts is common in the word cueing paradigm and is predicted by the frequency of previous thoughts about the events. In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate these findings while excluding several contaminating factors that could have contributed to the high frequency of direct responses in Experiment 1. First, in Experiment 1, the specificity of future event representations could not be meaningfully checked (because participants only provided a brief title for each event they imagined) and it could thus be the case that some event representations that were directly formed were in fact not specific. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we asked participants to describe imagined events in more detail, such that we could estimate the prevalence of direct access for trials involving the imagination of a specific event. Second, it could be that some events participants reported as directly produced were in fact not truly anticipated experiences: another possibility would be that the cue word directly triggered the memory of a past event which would then be simply recasted as a future event.
To investigate this "recasting hypothesis" (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Gamboz, Brandimonte, & De Vito, 2010) , we asked participants to evaluate the similarity of MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS each imagined future event to past experiences and to indicate whether they used past events to imagine this future event.
Method
Participants. Twenty undergraduate students (10 females and 10 males) aged between 18 and 30 years (M = 21.3 years, SD = 2.8 years) participated in this study. A power analysis using the MLPowSim Software Package (Browne, Golalizadeh, & Parker, 2009 ) indicated that this sample size at level 2 (participants) and a sample size of 15 at level 1 (events; see below) yielded an estimated power of above 0.95 to detect a significant effect (with an alpha of 0.05, two-tailed) of the size observed in Experiment 1 for the effect of frequency of previous thoughts on the odds of direct responses for future events. All participants provided written informed consent and were tested individually.
Materials and procedure. The procedure and materials were similar as in Experiment 1, with the following modifications. First, only cue words referring to objects (e.g., book, bottle) or locations (e.g., hotel, restaurant) were used in this experiment; feeling words were removed because previous research suggests that they may involve distinct retrieval processes in the word cueing task (e.g., Conway et al., 2001) . Second, participants were only instructed to imagine future events (i.e., there was no past event condition) and the number of trials was increased to 15. Third, there was no constraint regarding the temporal distance of imagined events. Fourth, after each event had been produced, participants were invited to describe the event on a sheet of paper, and they were asked to describe it with sufficient details so that MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS someone could understand that it referred to a specific event. We used these instructions so that we could later check that each reported event was specific.
Immediately after the 15 trials, participants were instructed to come back to each future event they imagined and, as in Experiment 1, they were invited to date each event, to indicate whether they previously thought about this event (by answering "yes" or "no"; if they responded "yes", they were also asked to rate the extent to which they previously thought about this event, from 1 = very rarely, to 7 = very often), and to rate its personal importance (from 1= not at all important, to 7 = extremely important). Furthermore, in the present experiment, participants were also asked to rate the similarity of the imagined event to previously experienced events (from 1 = the exact same event was experienced previously, to 5 = the event is completely novel; Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010) and to indicate whether they thought about one or more past event(s) during the imagination of the future event (by answering "yes" or "no"; if they responded "yes", they were also asked to indicate if they used this or these event(s) for imagining the future event, by answering "yes or "no").
Finally, participants were asked to determine whether the imagined future event was linked to one or more future event(s) produced on a previous trial (by answering "yes" or "no").
Scoring. All events were scored as specific or non-specific by the first author. Events were considered specific if they referred to events happening on a particular occasion (i.e., in a specific place at a specific time) and lasting no longer than a day (Williams et al., 1996) . A random selection of 20% of events was also independently scored by the second author. The coefficient of raw agreement ra = 0.95; we did not assess the degree of rater agreement using Cohen's k because of the marginal dependency of k for extreme marginal distributions (see von Eye & von Eye, 2008 ; in the present case, the marginal distributions were not uniform, with the cell frequency corresponding to a rating of non-specificity by both raters being 0). MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS
Results
In total, the 20 participants reported 300 future events. However, 17 of these events (from 12 participants) did not refer to a specific happening; these events were excluded from the analyses, thus leaving 283 specific future events. As in Experiment 1, participants reported that the majority of future events they imagined came directly to mind (mean proportion = 0.63, SEM = 0.03), and a paired sample t-test showed that RTs were significantly faster for direct than generative responses (means of median RTs were 4943 ms, SEM = 571 ms, and 17352 ms, SEM = 1912 ms, for direct and generative responses, respectively), t(19) = 8.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.83.
In line with Experiment 1, we found that the direct mode of production of future events depended on having previously thought about these events: the percentage of direct responses was significantly higher for events that had been thought of previously (71%) than for events that had not been thought of previously (41%; coefficient = 1.34, SE = 0.29, Z = 4.62, p < 0.001); among future events that had been thought of previously, the odds of direct response increased with the frequency of previous thoughts about the events (coefficient = 0.41, SE = 0.15, Z = 2.73, p = 0.006). As in Experiment 1, the majority of future events that were accessed directly (84%) had been thought of on a previous occasion. We also replicated the finding of Experiment 1 that the odds of direct response increased with the importance attributed to the events (coefficient = 0.27, SE = 0.08, Z = 3.23, p = 0.001).
Next, we investigated whether the direct mode production of future events could be explained by the recasting hypothesis (i.e., participants may directly retrieve a past event and then simply recast it as a future event). As a first test of this hypothesis, we examined whether MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS general information about one's life, yet without the need to engage in an active search to access such information).
Scoring. Event specificity was scored using the same method as in Experiment 2. The coefficient of raw agreement ra = 0.94; again we did use Cohen's k to express the degree of rater agreement because the marginal distributions were not uniform (von Eye & von Eye, 2008) .
In total, the 20 participants reported 200 past events and 200 future events. However, 8 past events and 15 future events were not specific. These non-specific events were discarded and thus the reported analyses were based on 192 past events and 185 future events. Although the two dimensions used to define direct access (i.e., search effort and information use) were related, they were not entirely equivalent (26% of events were classified as direct for one dimension and non-direct for the other dimension); thus we analyzed each dimension separately.
First, we investigated the frequency of direct access as defined by search effort. The mean proportion of events that were produced with no apparent search effort is shown in Figure 3a , as a function of temporal orientation (past vs. future). In line with Experiments 1 and 2, the majority of events were produced without search effort, and there was no significant differences between past and future events in this respect, t(19) = 0.90, p = .38, d = 0.20. Next, we examined the frequency of direct access as defined by information use. The mean proportion of self-reports of events that immediately came to mind in response to the cue (i.e., without accessing more general information first) is shown on Figure 3b , as a MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS function of temporal orientation. As can be seen, participants judged that the majority of events came immediately to mind, not only for past events but also for future events; a paired sample t-test showed no significant difference between past and future events in terms of immediacy of access, t(19) = 1.04, p = .31, d = 0.23.
We also examined whether the verbal protocols obtained while participants produced the events were consistent with their answers to the information use question. The first author listened to each verbal report and judged whether or not some general information was reported before a specific event was described, while blind to how participants had answered the information use question. We then compared the degree of concordance between the coder's judgments and the participants' answers to the information use question. The strength of agreement was good (k = .74, 95% CI: .67-.81), thus providing support for the reliability of participants' judgments of information use.
Next, we examined whether RTs differed as a function of the two dimensions of event production that were investigated here. First, we computed, for each participant, the median RT for past and future events, as a function of whether or not the production of the event required search effort. Means across participants are shown in Figure 4a . A 2 (search effort) X 2 (temporal orientation) ANOVA revealed a main effect of search effort, F (1, 19) = 23.87, p < 0.001, η p 2 = 0.56, indicating that participants took on average more time to produce a specific event when it required a search effort than when it required no search effort. There was no main effect of temporal orientation, F(1, 19) = 0.08, p = 0.78, η p 2 = 0.004, but there was a significant interaction between temporal orientation and search effort, F(1, 19) = 5.14, p = 0.04, η p 2 = 0.21. This interaction indicated that RTs tended to be faster for past events than for future events when the events were produced with no search effort, t ( 
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we sought to delve deeper into the nature of the direct production of memories and future thoughts by distinguishing between two dimensions: search effort and information use. We found that participants not only reported that memories and future thoughts were frequently produced with no search effort (in line with Experiments 1 and 2), but also that they came immediately to mind (i.e., without accessing more general information first). Moreover, for both dimensions characterizing direct production, we found that RTs were faster for direct than for generative responses. We also asked participants to report everything that went into their minds while producing the events and the analysis of their verbal protocols showed that the information described was in good agreement with
participants' own judgments of information use. MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS
In the present experiment, the percentage of episodic future thoughts that were produced without accessing general information first (57%) was much higher than the percentage we observed in a previous study (16%) in which direct and generative modes of formation were assessed using a think-aloud method (D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011, Study 1). A key difference between the two studies is that D'Argembeau and Mathy required participants to imagine novel events (i.e., events that had not been previously experienced or thought of), whereas in the current experiment the novelty of events was left unspecified. As
shown by the results of Experiments 1 and 2, the large majority of future events that were directly produced in the current paradigm have already been thought of on at least one previous occasion (and thus were not novel), which likely explains why the frequency of direct access is substantially higher than in D'Argembeau and Mathy (this point is discussed further in the General Discussion).
General Discussion
The present research aimed to unravel the modes of production of episodic future thoughts in the word cueing paradigm. Across three experiments, we found that future event representations were produced through the same dual mechanisms, direct and generative, as autobiographical memories (Uzer et al., 2012) . On the majority (i.e., around 60%) of trials, participants reported that a future event directly came to mind in response to the cue and the prevalence of such direct production of episodic future thoughts was comparable to the prevalence of directly retrieved memories for past events; RT data confirmed that event representations were produced much faster for direct than for generative responses, both for the past and the future. These results were observed not only when direct access was conceptualized in terms of search effort, but also in terms of information use (Experiment 3). MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS When looking at the determinants of direct responses, we found that most past and future events that were directly produced had already been thought of on a previous occasion, and the frequency of previous thoughts predicted the occurrence of direct access (Experiments 1 & 2). Importantly, however, the future thoughts that were directly produced did not simply consist in remembered past events recasted as future events (Experiment 2) and could more appropriately be conceptualized as "memories of the future," that is, future events that had been envisioned on a previous occasion (Ingvar, 1985; Szpunar et al., 2013) . The personal relevance of events was also a significant predictor of the mode of production of autobiographical thoughts, with direct access being more frequent for past and future events that were important and emotionally intense (Experiments 1 & 2). Collectively, these findings provide novel evidence that the direct production of episodic future thoughts is frequent in the word cueing paradigm and often involves the activation of personally significant memories of the future.
Recent theoretical and empirical work on episodic future thinking has emphasized the role of constructive and generative processes in the production of future event representations (e.g., D 'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) .
While not downplaying the importance of such processes, the present research shows that episodic future thoughts are not necessarily effortfully generated, but instead can come to mind rapidly, with no search effort and information manipulation, in response to a cue (see also Anderson et al., 2012; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Finnbogadottir & Berntsen, 2013 , for related observations). Most importantly, however, our data suggest that the direct production of episodic future thoughts mainly occur for events that have already been contemplated on a previous occasion, rather than novel events (i.e., events that have not been previously imagined or experienced). Thus, the mechanisms involved in MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS the formation of episodic future thoughts seem to critically depend on the types of future events that are produced: effortful constructive processes (e.g., the extraction and flexible recombination of details from past experiences) may mainly be required for simulating novel future events (Schacter et al., 2008 (Schacter et al., , 2012 , and indeed our previous work suggests that for newly imagined events, the use of generative processes is the dominant mode of production of episodic future thoughts (D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) . On the other hand, as shown by the present research, when the constraint to imagine a novel event is removed, episodic future thoughts frequently consist in pre-stored representations of previously imagined events that are accessed directly.
While it is true that most of the episodic future thoughts that were produced directly referred to previously imagined events, it is worth noting that some future thoughts were formed directly and yet participants reported that they had not previously thought about the corresponding events; this occurred for 27% and 16% of directly produced future thoughts in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. These figures align with the previous observation that when participants were explicitly instructed to imagine novel future events, 16% of episodic future thoughts appeared to be formed directly (D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011, Study 1).
Thus, while the notion of memories of the future can account for most instances of direct production of episodic future thoughts, some thoughts do not easily conform to this explanation. This is an intriguing finding and the exact nature of the mechanisms allowing the direct formation of novel episodic future thoughts should be further investigated in future studies. Perhaps some personal goals or concerns are so salient in a person's mind that anticipations and plans related to these goals are formed rapidly and automatically (Klinger, 2013 Be it as it may, from a methodological point of view, the present results highlight the importance of instructions in determining the processes by which episodic future thoughts are produced. In some previous studies of episodic future thinking, participants were explicitly instructed to produce novel future events (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007) , whereas novelty was left unspecified in other studies (e.g., D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) .
Taken together, the present research and our previous work (D 'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) suggest that these two situations differ in the relative contribution of direct and generative processes to the production of future event representations: generative processes are dominant when event novelty is emphasized, whereas direct access is more frequent when event novelty is left unspecified. This may be an important point to consider when interpreting deficits in the production of episodic future thoughts that are observed in various clinical populations (e.g., Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Williams et al., 1996) .
It is also worth mentioning that, in the present experiments, participants were asked to bring specific future events to mind but did not have to construct detailed mental simulations of these events (e.g., by visualizing the location, persons, objects, and actions involved).
Referring to the proposed distinction between construction and elaboration phases of episodic MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS future thought (Addis et al., 2007) , our results mainly pertain to the former phase (i.e., bringing a specific event to mind) and additional work should therefore be conducted to determine whether and to what extent detailed mental simulations of future events can also be formed directly, with no search effort.
The implications of the present findings for hierarchical models of autobiographical memory and future thinking warrant further discussion. According to such models (see e.g., Conway, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; D'Argembeau, 2015) , different types of knowledge structures varying in levels of abstraction contribute to past and future thoughts, with knowledge structures at higher levels of abstraction (e.g., broad goals, lifetime periods, and general events) providing information that contextualizes and locates specific event representations. What the present results show is that the production of specific memories and future thoughts does not necessarily involve a top-down search through such a hierarchical knowledge base-in which more abstract representations would be used for constructing specific event representations (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) . Top-down search processes may be involved in the formation of novel or infrequently considered event representations, but for events that are more frequently part of one's mental landscape, the present data suggest the existence of pre-stored representations that can be directly accessed in response to relevant cues. This does not imply, however, that these event representations are not part of a hierarchical autobiographical knowledge base. In other words, while the present findings argue against the necessity of a hierarchical search process in the production of specific event representations, they are neutral with respect to the assumed hierarchical organization of autobiographical knowledge. In fact, many past and future event representations are structured in higher-level clusters that organize sequences of causally or thematically related events (Brown, 2005; Brown & Schopflocher, 1998; D'Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; Demblon & MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS D'Argembeau, 2014) , and such higher-order organization could actually promote the direct production of autobiographical thoughts (i.e., the activation of one event within a cluster may tend to automatically trigger other related events). In line with this view, it has been found that pairs of associated events are produced faster when the events are part of the same cluster (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998) .
Finally, we note that the direct and rapid access to previously imagined events may be an important factor in the adaptive value of prospection. Episodic future thought allows the anticipation and simulation of potential goal-relevant events and actions (i.e., events and actions that are conductive or obstructive to reaching personal goals), which in turn can inform decisions and plans and, ultimately, guide behavior (D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Schacter, 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998) .
Successful goal pursuit may depend, in part, on the ability to remember the content of anticipated events, plans, and outcomes (Ingvar, 1985; Szpunar et al., 2013) , and the rapid access to such representations may help guide behavior more efficiently and effectively. In other words, successful goal pursuit may benefit from mechanisms that make goal-related future thoughts highly accessible, such that they can be automatically triggered when a relevant (internal or external) cue is encountered. The present research provides preliminary support for the existence of such mechanisms, by showing that episodic future thoughts that are considered more important (thus presumably involving goal-related contents) are more frequently formed in a fast and direct way. MODES OF PRODUCTION OF FUTURE THOUGHTS 
